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THE HUMAN PROPERTY GAP*
I. INTRODUCTION
The body is the one thing that is truly and uniquely one's
own. The law acknowledges this by creating penalties for in-
terfering with another person's body and by permitting indi-
viduals to decide how, when, and for what purpose their bod-
ies may be used. Individuals may recover in tort if their names,
images, or likenesses are used for commercial profit without
their consent.' They may also be compensated for their men-
tal and physical labors. The law even allows people, to a limit-
ed extent, to "sell" their bodies in exchange for financial remu-
neration However, that seems to be the extent of how a hu-
man body may be legally "sold."
On July 9, 1990, the California Supreme Court decided
the appeal of Moore v. Regents of the University of California. In
his majority opinion, Justice Panelli wrote that a patient may
have a cause of action for breach of a physician's fiduciary
duty to inform a patient of all the material facts which would
affect the decision to undergo medical treatment.' This duty
to obtain the patient's informed consent requires the physician
to inform the patient of any research or economic interests the
physician may have in the patient's cells.' The court held that
Dr. Golde, Moore's physician, breached this fiduciary duty to
inform his patient and obtain consent on that basis.' However,
the majority found Moore's property or ownership interests in
his excised cells insufficient to support a second cause of ac-
* The author gratefully acknowledges and thanks Professor June Carbone of
the Santa Clara University School of Law for her help and advice in writing this
comment.
1. Mary Taylor Danforth, Comment, Cells, Sales, and Royalties: The Patient's
Right to a Portion of the Profits, 6 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 179, 193 (1988).
2. Jennifer Lavoie, Comment, Ownership of Human Tissue: Lfe After Moore v.
Regents of the University of California, 75 VA. L. REV. 1363, 1368-69 (1989). See infra
note 107.
3. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
4. Id. at 483.
5. Id. at 485-86.
6. Id.
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tion for conversion In addition, the court held that Moore
could not have a property interest in the Mo cell line' which
was developed from his cells and patented by Dr. Golde and
another researcher, since the cell line they developed changed
the character of the cells and was the product of the inventive
effort of the holders of the patent. Justice Panelli limited his
decision by stating only that there was an insufficient property
interest in excised human cells to support a cause of action for
conversion under California law,' implying that Moore may
have retained enough of an ownership or property right to
constitute some other cause of action in property." Such a
cause of action might involve a bailment or a license.
2
This comment will address the nature and extent of an
individual's property interest in his or her cells and the prod-
ucts developed from them, assuming the Court's decision re-
garding the property issue in Moore is wrong. It will discuss the
reasonableness of allowing doctors, hospitals and research
institutes to claim commercial property interests in human
tissues when the persons from whom those cells were obtained
have no such rights under California law." It will also discuss
the issue of a patient's right to withhold consent to use his or
her body in medical research and the legal consequences of
that action.' Cell lines are valuable commodities in the com-
mercial market because they are difficult to obtain" and often
produce abnormally high amounts of substances that are use-
ful in medical research. 6 The effectiveness of proposed solu-
7. Id. at 492.
8. Id. The Mo cell line was developed from the cells of John Moore. Its
products include interferon, neutophil migration inhibition factor,
granulocytemacrophage colony stimulating factor, and macrophage activating factor.
These products are proteins that are useful in the treatment of cancer and AIDS.
Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1366 n.21. See George J. Annas, Whose Waste is it Anyway?
The Case of John Moore, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Oct.-Nov. 1988, at 37. See
Danforth, supra note 1, at 195.
9. Moore, 793 P.2d at 479.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See infra notes 180, 183.
13. See infra notes 93-133 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
15. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1367-68.
16. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1367-68. "A cell line is a group of identical cells
that have been derived from a single human or animal cell and are capable of
replicating outside the human (or animal) body." Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1363
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tions to the problem of compensation for the use of an
individual's cells or body parts, including licensing, bailment,
and patent participation, will be addressed in relation to the
Moore decision. 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. History
The development of property rights in the human body
has roughly paralleled that of biotechnology. 8 As medical and
technological advances have been made, the law has adapted.
Early English common law did not recognize a property inter-
est in dead bodies.19 In the late eighteenth century, with the
advent of "medicine" and the appearance of medical schools,
dead bodies became more valuable for research purposes."
At that time, both the American and English courts began to
recognize a quasi-property right in dead bodies which
stemmed from the religious concept of retaining human digni-
ty." This new right either mandated that the institution which
last had control over the body to bury or dispose of it in a
proper and dignified manner, or that the relatives of the de-
ceased or a designated party be permitted to direct the buri-
al.' This quasi-property interest is presently an integral part
of the limited property rights in human bodies which are cur-
rently recognized under modern law."5
Thus, one cannot have complete property rights in either
his own or another person's body. 4 The time when human
bodies were freely alienable in the United States passed with
n.4.
17. See infra notes 176-96 and accompanying text.
18. Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing
Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 206, 208
n.1 (1986). Biotechnology is "the collection of industrial processes that involve the
use of biological systems. For some industries, these processes involve the use of
genetically engineered microorganisms." ROBERT C. KING & WILLIAM D.
STANFIELD, A DICTIONARY OF GENETICS 44 (3d ed. 1985).
19. Thomas McKendree Chattin, Jr., Note, Property Rights in Dead Bodies, 71
W. VA. L REv. 377 (1969).
20. 1d. at 378.
21. Id. at 379.
22. Id. at 379 n.20, 381.
23. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1371.
24. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1373.
1992]
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the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States."5 A live human body cannot be
bought and sold as a commercial commodity."
California law currently allows: (1) a quasi-property right
in dead bodies for the purposes of burial;" (2) a dispositional
right to provide the "services" of donating blood, sperm, and
various other tissues;2' and (3) the dispositional right to do-
nate one's whole body or bodily organs" to medical science
for the purposes of education, research or transplant." A per-
son may be paid for a donation of blood or sperm, but for
purposes of tort law these are considered to be services and
not sales."' Under the California Health and Safety Code, or-
gans are defined as nonregenerative tissues which are usually
removed from dead bodies. Tissues are defined as regenerative
body parts which can be safely removed from a live person on
a continuous, but limited, basis. 2 According to these defini-
tions, kidneys, livers and eyes are organs;"5 blood, sperm,
bone marrow, and skin are tissues."
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,"3 which has been
adopted by all fifty states prevents individuals from selling
25. "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,
§ 1.
26. It is "unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplanta-
tion if the transfer affects interstate commerce." National Organ Transplant Act,
42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
27. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1370. See also Sinai Temple v. Kaplan, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 80 (Ct. App. 1976).
28. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1372.
29. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1991). See also Cal. Penal Code
§ 367(0 (Deering 1985).
30. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1991).
31. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1372-73. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESS-
MENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES
AND CELLS (1987) [hereinafter new developments].
32. CALIFORNIA HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1635(c) (tissues); CALIFORNIA PE-
NAL CODE § 367(f)(c)(1) (West 1987) (organs); Danforth, supra note 1, at 194-95;
42 U.S.C. §274(e) (Supp. 1985); 5 Rep. No. 382, 98th Congress 2d Sess. 16-17.
33. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
34. Danforth, supra note 1, at 194.
35. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U;L.A. 15 (1991). See also CAL. PENAL
CODE § 367(f (Deering Supp. 1990).
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their organs for valuable consideration.' The holding in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty5' is consistent with the policy that the hu-
man body should not be sold. The Court stated that it is possi-
ble tO obtain a patent for organisms that represent the product
of human ingenuity, but not for naturally occurring organ-
isms." This is the first case that has held that human beings
could have a commercial interest in the product of their own
cells. 9 Yet doctors and hospitals may sell human organs and
tissues to medical schools and research facilities. 0 In fact,
much research is performed on human subject matter ob-
tained in this manner." In addition, doctors, hospitals, and
research institutes, among others, have been permitted to prof-
it handsomely from the commercial products created from
experiments on human tissue." These products include hor-
mone derivatives and medications used in the treatment of
AIDS, Alzheimer's disease and Parkinson's disease.43 In short,
everyone seems to receive a portion of the profits except the
person from whom the tissue originated. The obvious question
is: if the patient does not have a sufficient property interest in
the cells taken from his or her own body as well as in their
subsequent products to support a cause of action for conver-
sion, how can a property right vest in a anyone else?
B. The Moore Case
In 1976, John Moore discovered that he had hairy-cell
leukemia, which is a form of cancer of the blood that is fatal
36. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. 15 (1991).
37. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
38. Id. at 310.
39. Id:
40. See Lori B. Andrews, My Body, My Propety, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT,
Oct. 1986, at 28.
41. Id.
42. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 481-82 (Cal.), cemt.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990)..
43. Mark W. Danis, Comment, Fetal Tissue Transplants: Restricting Recipient
Designation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1079 (1988). See also Lance Morrow, When One Body
Can Save Another, TIME, June 17, 1991, at 56.
44. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1365 n.12.
Hairy cell leukemia, or leukemic reticuloendotheliosis, is a rare form
of cancer characterized by the presence of abnormal mononuclearcells
in the blood, bone marrow, and other tissues. Other characteristics
include destruction of normal blood cells, enlargement of the spleen,
1992]
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if untreated.45 After receiving the initial diagnosis, he went to
the UCLA Medical Center where he was hospitalized by Dr.
Golde.46 The doctor withdrew extensive amounts of blood,
bone marrow aspirate, sperm and other bodily substances dur-
ing the course of Moore's treatment.47 Dr. Golde confirmed
the initial cancer diagnosis and advised Moore to have his
spleen removed. The spleen was enlarged and the doctor be-
lieved that immediate removal would slow the progress of the
disease. 8 The operation did have a positive therapeutic ef-
fect. 9 Moore survived.
For the next seven years, Moore periodically visited the
UCLA medical center." On each visit, Dr. Golde removed
samples of blood, sperm, bone marrow aspirate, blood serum
and skin.' Although Dr. Golde obtained Moore's consent to
the splenectomy and to the removal of his tissues, at no
time did he inform Moore of his economic and research inter-
ests in Moore's spleen and other cells." Moore was simply
told that these procedures were necessary to his treatment and
well-being. In fact, Dr. Golde's reason for removing these sam-
ples was to supply them to a researcher for commercial devel-
opment. 4
From the beginning, Dr. Golde was aware that Moore's
cells had certain unusual properties5 which made them espe-
and infiltration of the bone marrow, spleen, and lymph nodes by
tumor cells.
Id.
45. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1365.
46. Moore, 793 P.2d at 480.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 486 n.l.
50. Id. at 481.
51. Id.
52. A splenectomy is the surgical removal of the spleen. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. See also The Use of Human Biological Materials in the Development of Bio-
medical Products: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigation and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1985) (statement
of John Moore) [hereinafter Moore Statement].
55. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481. Moore's T-lymphocytes overproduced certain
lymphokines, making the corresponding genetic material easier to identify. Id. at
482 n.2.
A T-lymphocyte is a type of white blood cell. T- lymphocytes produce
lymphokines, or proteins that regulate the immune system. Some
lymphokines have potential therapeutic value. If the genetic material
[Vol. 32962
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cially attractive for research.' He was also aware of the sub-
stantial commercial value that exclusive access to these cells
would provide. 7 Unknown to Moore, Dr. Golde arranged for
the commercial development of the cell line and its derivative
products before the splenectomy.' Dr. Golde was highly com-
pensated by Genetics Institute and Sandoz Pharmaceutical
Company for obtaining exclusive access to Moore's cells and
for his help in developing the Mo cell line."9 This cell line pro-
responsible for producing a particular lymphokine can be identified, it
can sometimes be used to manufacture large quantities of the
lymphokine through the techniques of recombinant DNA.
Id. (citations omitted).
Inside the cell, a gene produces a lymphokine by attracting protein
molecules, which bond to form a strand of "messenger RNA"
(mRNA) in the mirror image of the gene. The mRNA strand then
detaches from the gene and attracts other protein molecules, which
bond to form the lymphokine that the original gene encoded.
In the laboratory, scientists sometimes use genes to manufacture
lymphokines by cutting a gene from the chromosome and grafting it
onto the chromosome of a bacterium. The resulting chromosome is
an example of "recombinant DNA," or DNA composed of genetic
material from more than one individual or species. As the bacterium
lives and reproduces, the engrafted gene continues to produce the
lymphokine that the gene encodes.
It can be extremely difficult to identify the gene that carries the code
for a particular lymphokine. Since the amount of DNA in a human
cell is enormous compared to the amount present in an individual
gene, the search for any single gene within a cell is like searching for
a needle in a haystack. As the Regents' patent application explains,
the significance of a cell that overproduces mRNA is to make the
difficult search for a particular gene unnecessary. If one has an ade-
quate source of mRNA-the gene's mirror image-it can be used to
make a copy, or clone, of the original gene. The cloned gene can
then be used in recombinant DNA, as already described, for
large-scale production of lymphokines. Id. at 490 n.29 (citations omit-
ted). While the genetic code for lymphokines does not vary from indi-
vidual to individual, it can nevertheless be quite difficult to locate the
gene responsible for a particular lymphokine. Because T-lymphocytes
produce many different lymphokines, the relevant gene is often very
difficult to locate.
Id. at 482 n.2 (citing NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 31, at 31.46).
56. Id. at 481.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 482. Golde received at least $330,000 from Genetics Institute over a
three year period, acquired the rights to 75,000 shares of their common stock,
and an additional $110,000 from Sandoz when that company was added to the
agreement. Id.
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duced lymphokines from Moore's T-lymphocytes, the white
blood cells that produce the proteins that regulate the immune
system.' The derivative Mo cell line was subsequently patent-
ed. Dr. Golde was listed as an inventor on the patent along
with Dr. Quan, the major researcher for Genetics Institute."'
Dr. Golde was permitted to benefit twice from Moore, once
through the payment of medical expenses, and again from the
sale of his cells and the patented cell line they created.
When Golde offered to pay for the transportation re-
quired for Moore's visits to UCLA Medical Center, Moore
began to suspect that something was amiss.' He became in-
creasingly suspicious when Golde presented him with addition-
al consent forms, one of which he signed.'3 When Moore re-
fused to sign the second form and inquired why he was re-
quired to sign additional consent forms, Golde evaded his
patient's inquiries regarding his treatment and denied that he
had ulterior motives for continuing to treat Moore." Finally,
Moore sued. Golde had never offered to compensate Moore
for the use of his cells or his spleen. 5
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act prohibits individuals
from selling their organs.' Also, although blood and sperm
can be sold to blood or sperm banks in California, donating
blood is considered to be a service rather than an exchange of
property.."' Because Dr. Golde failed to disclose his economic
interests in Moore's cells, the court found that Dr. Golde had
failed to meet the requirements of full disclosure. Complete
disclosure of all the material facts which might have influenced
a patient's decision to undergo treatment is required by law.'
60. ld. at 483 n.2. Some lymphokines have potential therapeutic value. See
New Developments, supra note 31, at 31-46.
61. Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
62. Moore Statement, supra note 54, at 241-43.
63. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1366.
64. Id.
65. See generally Moore, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
66. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 n.22 (Cal.
1990) (gift of an organ is not a sale); see also Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, 8A
U.L.A. 15 (1991); infra note 107.
67. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 n.23 (Cal.
1990) (blood is a service); see also Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1372. See also Office of
Technology Assessment, New Developments in Biotechnology: Ownership of Human
Tissues and Cells 56, 76 (1987). See also infra note 107.
68. Moore, 793 P.2d at 483.
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Because of the fraudulent nature of this omission, Moore's
consent was not an informed one, and the Supreme Court of
California allowed him to state a cause of action for Golde's
breach of the physician's fiduciary duty to his patients.69
Although the majority in Moore found insufficient proper-
ty interests in the actual excised cells to allow Moore to recov-
er," it did not address the issue of Moore's property interest
in the disposition of the cells before they were removed from
his body. Before Moore's spleen was removed, Dr. Golde had
entered into a lucrative agreement with a research institute
which required him to continually deliver enough of Moore's
tissue to develop a patentable lymphokine-producing cell
line." Although Moore agreed to the splenectomy, which did
have a positive therapeutic effect, the follow-up tissue removals
were not necessary and served no therapeutic purpose."
Moore was never informed of Golde's use of his cells, nor did
he ever agree that his cells could be used in research.' Nor
did Moore donate any of his organs, tissues, or cells to scientif-
ic research.74 Indeed, if he had been fully informed of Golde's
intentions with respect to his cells, Moore may have chosen to
negotiate a contract for his cells with the research company
himself. Since he possessed exclusive property rights in those
cells before they were removed from his body, it follows that
he would have had the power to negotiate such a deal."
C. The Financial Benefits of Research on Human Tissue
When human tissue is used for medical research, as it was
in the Moore case, there are numerous opportunities for profit.
The first such opportunity for profit from human tissue arises
from the sale of the body part or tissue to the researcher. An
organ or tissue which is rare or difficult to preserve has a
greater value to the researcher. If it were legal to sell human
tissues or organs in the United States, the price of a part lack-
ing special properties valuable for research or transplant pur-
69. Id.
70. Id. at 488.
71. Id. at 481; see also Danforth, supra note 1, at 179 n.2.
72. I.
73. 1d.
74. Id.
75. Id.
9651992]
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poses would command a relatively low price. 6 However, the
price of those same tissues would increase if they could be
used in transplant surgery or to create patentable cell lines or
medicines. Such organs are presently sold for high prices in
India, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe."
The second opportunity for profit occurs when the cells
are developed into a patentable product. The patent holders
own the rights to royalties from the sale and commercialization
of the invention, as well as the right to sell the patent for prof-
it.7" These are property interests which vest only in the inven-
tors and the subsequent owners of the patent rights."
The third opportunity to profit from the research occurs
when the patent is either sold or licensed to a manufacturer
who will then produce a commercial product from the results
of the research.' That person owns the rights to that product.
The final opportunity to profit from research on human tis-
sues arises if the holders of the patent choose to manufacture
and market the subject of the patent themselves.8' If the hu-
man subject who made all of this possible has no property
claim to the patent, he is excluded from all of the potential
commercial profits." If he may not sell his body parts, the
patient is effectively excluded from -the vast financial windfall
which will be collected by people who appear to have far less
of a property claim to his cells than he does. Yet this is exactly
what current law promotes.
76. Danforth, supra note 1, at 195-97. See also Hardiman, supra note 18, at
208 n.1; see, e.g., Andrews, supra note 40, at 30-31.
77. Trading Flesh Around the Globe, TIME, Jun. 17, 1991, at 61. Organs donat-
ed in the People's Republic of China come mainly from executed prisoners. Id. In
India, the going rates for organs from live donors are kidney, $1,500; cornea,
$4,000; patch of skin, $50. 1d. Presently, Hong Kong, Britain, and Germany have
already or are in the process of instituting laws banning all buying and selling of
organs. Id.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1992).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id § 271.
82. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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D. Fetal Tissue and Commercial Profit
Fetal tissue is one type of human body part that is impor-
tant for bio-medical research since it has several curative prop-
erties which can be exploited." It includes aborted fetuses,
frozen embryos, and placentas. Fetal tissue is a regenerative
tissue whose cells affect other cells in a way that makes them
act "younger." For this reason, fetal tissue is in great demand
for research in the commercial areas of cosmetics, anti-aging
products, and pharmaceuticals which are used to treat degen-
erative diseases, such as Parkinson's disease." The potential fi-
nancial benefit in these areas is overwhelmingly large, but ac-
cording to Moore v. Regents of the University of California,5 pa-
tients may not be able to partake of the profits.
The courts have been presented with some difficult deci-
sions regarding the control and disposition of fetal tissue. One
court has recognized that biological parents have a
dispositional right in the frozen embryos created from the cells
they donated.' As a result, one parent who does not wish fe-
tal tissue to be used for a particular purpose may prevent the
other from consenting to its use for that purpose." This is a
result of the legal concept that a child is treated as the "prop-
erty" of its parents." Fetal tissue presents significant problems
for use as commercial tissue because of the dual "ownership"
rights in the mother and the father as well as the ethical issue
of treating a potential human being as an item of property. 9
The use of prenatal tissue to cure disease is a concept fraught
with potential abuse. Women may voluntarily become preg-
nant for the sole purpose of aborting their fetuses and donat-
ing the tissue to sick friends and relatives, or, in the alterna-
83. Danis, supra note 43, at 1082-83.
84. Id See also Fetal Tissue Transplantation: Medical and Ethical Aspects 27
AGRESSOLOGIE, Oct. 1986, at 68. Aborted fetuses are used as a source of trans-
plant tissue for the treatment of diabetes and immunodeficiency diseases. Id.
85. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
86. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (1989); see John A. Robertson, Resolving
Disputes Over Frozen Embiyos, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Dec. 1989 at 9.
87. See Danforth, supra note 1, at 193.
88. The parents of the child may be obligated to provide financial support.
See Robertson, supra note 85, at 8; see also John A. Robertson, In the Beginning:
The Legal Status of Early Enbyos.
89. Robertson, supra note 85, at 9.
9671992]
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tive, they may be coerced into conceiving for abortion or tissue
donation.'
The same potential for abuse would arise should people
be permitted to sell their body parts for profit. If the poor
were suddenly able to sell their bodies or products of their
bodies such as fetuses they could discover a new source of
income at their own risk and expense." At worst, the regular
practice of selling body parts could cause the dehumanization
of the individual into the butcher value of the sum of his parts.
This appears to be the situation Justice Panelli is attempting to
avoid in the Moore opinion.
In 1988, in response to the potential problems involved
from the use of fetal tissue, the Department of Health and
Human Services banned all of the experiments at the National
Institute for Health that used tissue from aborted fetuses.'
However, these bans only affected federal research which was
funded by this Department. These regulations do not preempt
state laws."
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
In Moore v. Regents of the University of California," Justice
Panelli stated that the patient had a proper cause of action in
tort for the doctor's breach of his fiduciary duty, but that the
same patient did not possess enough property rights in his
excised cells to maintain a cause of action for conversion. 5 In
California, the tort of conversion has three elements: "the
plaintiff's ownership or right of possession of the property at
the time of conversion; ... the defendant's wrongful taking or
disposition of another's property rights; and ... damages. "'
Although the Moore court eliminated the patient's property
interest, it apparently did not eliminate the doctor's property
interest. The doctor who defrauded Moore was allowed to
accumulate vast sums of money for himself and the research
90. Danis, supra note 43, at 1091.
91. Andrews, supra note 40, at 32.
92. Danis, supra note 43, at 1086.
93. Danis, supra note 43, at 1086.
94. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cerl. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
95. Id.
96. Baldwin v. Marina City Properties, 145 Cal. Rptr. 406, 416 (Ct. App.
1978).
968 [Vol. 32
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companies for whom he procured the cells.' Moore was a
necessary, albeit unknowing, contributor to their wealth, and
as such he deserves to participate in the profits derived from
his tissue, due to his property interest in those cells." The
legal problem to be addressed is whether Moore's doctor, the
researchers, and the pharmaceutical companies obtained
enough of a property interest in his cells to maintain that they
owned them and the rights to their disposition without
Moore's consent, while Moore did not have a significant
enough property interest in the disposition of those same cells
to support a cause of action for conversion." This comment
suggests that Moore was wrongly decided on the property issue.
If a living human being may not exercise dispositive control
over his own body and its attached or detached body parts, but
someone else has the right to do so, we enter an area that
closely resembles slavery.
If someone can exercise control over an individual's body
parts once they are detached without that person's consent,
what is to prevent that someone from dictating, directing, or
otherwise expressing an ownership interest in a valuable body
part before it is removed? A doctor who recognizes that a
certain person's infected spleen has valuable characteristics will
undoubtedly wish to preserve those characteristics and the
spleen itself in its most profitable condition. Furthermore, any
medical advice that is given by a doctor who is aware of the
profitability of the unusual characteristics of that spleen might
be biased or even tainted in favor of preservation of the spleen
rather than in favor of the best interests of the patient. Finally,
doctors may be unjustly enriched if they are eligible to receive
both medical fees and finder's fees.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Summary of Property Interests in Human Bodies
There are several levels of ownership in human biological
materials. Living human bodies which are intact are under the
97. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481-82.
98. The court stated that Moore did not have a sufficient property interest in
the cells to maintain a cause of action for conversion. However, it did not state
that Moore had no property interest in those cells. Id. at 493-95.
99. Id.
9691992]
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exclusive control of that person."' A living person may do-
nate his organs to another living person if he wishes, but can-
not be compensated for it.'' In addition, a living person has
the right to agree to the donation of his organs after death for
the purposes of transplantation or scientific research."° How-
ever, he is forbidden from selling his organs for the purpose
of transplantation or treatment by federal law."3 Once organs
or tissues are removed from a patient's body, he no longer has
any significant property interest in them."
There is a quasi-property right in dead bodies for the
determination of custody for burial.' 5 While alive, a person
may agree to donate his organs for the purposes of transplan-
tation or treatment. However, federal law makes it a felony for
him to receive any compensation for those organs."
Blood and other replenishable bodily fluids which are
classified as regenerative parts of the body may be sold. 7
However, California treats these sales as services in order to
avoid strict liability issues for the blood banks, doctors and
donors."° Because cells are regenerative, they fall within this
100. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 499 (Cal. 1990)
(Broussard, J., concurring and dissenting).
101. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
102. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 6 (1991). Again, neither he
nor his estate may be compensated for it. National Organ ,Transplant Act, 42
U.S.C. § 274e (1988).
103. Uniform Anatomial Gift Act, § 10, 8A U.L.A. 26 (1991).
104. Moore, 793 P.2d at 489.
105. See Chattin, supra note 19.
106. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 10, 8A U.L.A. 18-19 (1991). It is a felony to
sell human organs for transplant purposes. Any such sale is punishable by up to
$50,000 in fines and/or up to five years imprisonment. Id.
107. Danforth, supra note 1, at 195.
108. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1372. See, e.g., NEW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
31, at 56. See Hardiman, supra note 18, at 220 n.64.
California statutory law declares that "[t]he procurement, processing,
distribution, or use" of blood for transfusions is a rendition of a
service. Cal health & Safety Code § 1606 (West 1979). Courts inter-
preting this statute consistently state that the legislature's object was
to avoid strict liability for the provision of so vital a service. Klaus v.
Alameda-Contra Costa Medical Ass'n. Blood Bank, Inc., 62 Cal. App.
3d 417, 133 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1976); Cramer v. Queen of Angels Hosp.,
62 Cal. App. 3d 812, 815, 133 Cal. Rptr. 339, 340 (1976) ("The effect
of section 1606 is that the doctrines of strict liability and breach of
implied warranty may not be used to shift the economic consequences
of the use of contaminated blood products to a supplier who is free
from fault." McDonald v. Sacramento Medical Found. Blood Bank, 62
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category and may be sold."° Generally, consent from the do-
nor must be obtained in order to perform medical research on
human subjects."0
1. Living Human Bodies
Human cells, organs, and other tissues which have not yet
been excised from a living human being but which remain part
of the living body are considered to be the property of the
person to whom they are attached."' The owner has an
exclusive right to direct the disposition and treatment of these
parts.' As such, they may be donated to others for trans-
plant, destroyed or removed at will."' In addition, each per-
son has legal remedies in tort for harmful interference with his
body."4 Both statutory and common law recognize the right
that a living human being has to exercise dominion over his
own body and to have it protected from interference from oth-
ers." To exercise any of these rights, a person must have
possession and ownership of the thing being protected."6
Thus, one's body is the property of the mental spirit occupying
the flesh which determines how it is to be used, disposed of,
and protected from interference.
2. Deceased Human Bodies
The dead also have statutorily recognized rights over the
disposition of their bodies."' Before death, a person may
choose how, when, and where his body will be interred or
disposed of, and whether he will allow his valuable organs to
Cal. App. 3d 866, 872, 133 Cal. Rptr. 444, 447 (1976) ("The object
and purpose of section 1606 is to shield blood donors and suppliers
from strict liability ... .
Id
109. Danforth, supra note 1, at 195.
110. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1376.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 2(a), 8A U.L.A. 6 (1991).
114. All of tort law encompasses this area with such causes of action as as-
sault, battery, negligence, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
115. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
116. 1&
117. See Chattin, supra note 19.
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be donated to a living person who needs them."" This pro-
cess is most often accomplished through a will, and it is sup-
ported by the fact that the law gives the family, or in some
instances a designated person, a quasi-property right in the
body of the deceased so that it may be laid to rest in a proper
and dignified manner."9 Thus, even after death, a human be-
ing has a great deal of control over the disposition and treat-
ment of his body. In effect, he still has a property interest in
that flesh.
3. Living Human Bodies with Excised Tissue, Cells, or Organs
By contrast, California law does not permit the living per-
son from whom cells are taken to control the disposition of
these cells." As long as the cells are attached to the living
whole, the person has all rights to them.'' Once they are re-
moved, however, the donor's property interest in those par-
ticular parts ceases." Because those portions of the body are
no longer a part of the working entity, the law assumes, usually
correctly, that the patient does not wish to keep the cells or
have anything more to do with them.'" The patient is no lon-
ger concerned with the removed cells, and they are in the
possession of a doctor who may choose to study or dispose of
them as the law permits.
Occasionally a patient is concerned about the disposition
of his cells. 4 Most human flesh is removed because it is ei-
ther infected or diseased or because it is no longer functional.
Doctors and other researchers have no reason to keep or study
such flesh except to identify and verify the diagnosis or to
study it if it involves a new or rare malady. In such cases,
the tissue would either be destroyed or used in research. 2
No harm comes to the patient through the appropriation of
118. Unif. Anatomical Gift Act, § 2(a), 8A U.LA. 6 (1991).
119. See Chattin, supra note 19.
120. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483, 498 (Md. Ct. App. 1976).
124. Id.
125. See generally CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1972) (human
waste flesh not properly destroyed or otherwise disposed of may only be kept for
primarily scientific purposes).
126. Id.
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such cells. This is a proper use of the cells since they are being
used primarily for a scientific purpose, and the patient suffers
no economic harm from the appropriation, since the doctor is
not being unjustly enriched through their use." The prob-
lem arises when the patient does not give the doctor permis-
sion to use the cells, and the doctor does not destroy them,
but takes possession of them in order to serve a primarily com-
mercial purpose rather than a scientific ofie. This is the situa-
tion in Moore v. Regents of the University of California." Not
only did Dr. Golde breach his fiduciary duty to Moore by
fraudulently taking his cells for non-therapeutic scientific re-
search without Moore's consent, but he profited handsomely
from that misappropriation.'
B. The Moore Case
The California Supreme Court held that John Moore
should recover from his physician, Dr. Golde, for the breach of
his fiduciary duty to Moore, but refused to hold Dr. Golde
liable for the tort of conversion."s Stating that Moore's claim
of ownership of the biological material removed from his body
while under the care of Dr. Golde was a novel one which had
no precedented support, the court held that Moore did not
have a sufficient property interest in his excised cells to sup-
port the "ownership" or "right of possession" element of con-
version.' The reasons given were: (1) Moore did not expect
to retain possession of the cells after they were removed; (2)
no judicial decision supported Moore's claim to ownership of
the cells; (3) California statutory law limits continuing interest
in excised cells; and (4) the patented materials, patent, and
products from the patented material could not be Moore's
property because they are the intellectual property of patent
holders.' For policy reasons, including the need to have ac-
cess to human cells for scientific research and to prevent strict
liability to innocent parties who have not checked the pedigree
127. Id.
128. 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 489.
132. Id. at 492.
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of each specimen they use in research,' the court stated that
recovery should be on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duty
or lack of informed consent only, not on the basis of conver-
sion. Thus, the court declined to extend the tort of conver-
sion."
1. The Property Interest in Excised Cells Before Removal
Likewise, while Moore's cells remained part of his body,
Dr. Golde had no property rights in them to exchange with
the research institute.3 Prior to removal of the cells, only
Moore had that property right." Dr. Golde was contracting
to sell something which he did not own. For that reason,
Moore should receive some, if not all, of the compensation Dr.
Golde received for procuring the cells, at least up to the time
of their removal from his body. As a matter of equity, if Moore
were entitled to receive all of the compensation that Dr. Golde
collected for delivering Moore's cells, a small portion of the
payment should have gone to Dr. Golde as a fee for bringing
the patient and company into contact with each other. This
result brings to the fore the issue of whether society really
wishes to encourage doctors to be middlemen in deals be-
tween patients and researchers.
2. Who Has Property Rights in Excised Cells
If Moore did not have sufficient property rights in his own
excised cells to maintain a cause of action for conversion, the
question is how Dr. Golde, the researcher, the research compa-
ny, and the various other scientific and commercial entities
involved in this case obtained property rights in those cells to
Moore's exclusion."7 There are no statutes giving property
rights in tissue removed from humans to anyone other than
the donor,"' unless the donor has specifically agreed to do-
nate them to a particular person or organization. There are
provisions for the disposal of such biological materials,"
133. Id. at 487.
134. I&
135. Id. at 489.
136. I.
137. Id. at 479.
138. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1985).
139. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1972) (implies sufficient
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which could involve a limited temporary property interest; but
there are no provisions for assignment of significant property
interests, only quasi-property rights.'40
The law fails to provide guidance for the situation which
arose in Moore. First, the court states that Moore does not have
any property interests in his own excised cells, then it upholds
the property rights of Moore's doctor and several commercial
entities in those same cells once they have been developed into
the Mo cell line.' Who held the property rights in those
cells in the interim period between the removal from Moore's
body and the patenting of the Mo cell line? The person who is
entitled to the property rights at that time is also entitled to
any potential financial gain during that period.
3. Property Interest in the Patent, Subject of the Patent, and
Profits Made from Use of the Patent
Federal law permits the patenting of organisms that repre-
sent the product of "human ingenuity," but not naturally oc-
curring organisms.'42 The inventive effort which Dr. Golde
and the other researchers put into the development of the Mo
cell line clearly qualifies them for the patent they were grant-
ed, and they are entitled to any compensation they may derive
from it. "The patent is not granted for the cell as it is found in
nature, but for the modified biogenetic product."'43 Thus,
Moore could have no property rights in the patent itself. How-
ever, Moore was a crucial contributor to the development of
the cell line. He was a supplier of raw materials, human cells
and organs. Because he was a necessary component of the
research who provided the researchers with "unique raw mate-
rials, without which the resulting product could not exist,"''
excluding him from compensation' would not be equitable.
The commercial entities and Dr. Golde would receive unjust
enrichment since they could use Moore's raw materials to cre-
interest to direct disposal).
140. Chattin, supra note 19, at 381.
141. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
142. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 313 (1980).
143. Danforth, supra note 1, at 197.
144. Danforth, supra note 1, at 197.
145. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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ate a valuable product without ever having to compensate him
for that use. 46
Moore should be compensated in proportion to his contri-
bution.' There are a few ways to do this. The doctor and/or
researchers could pay him the actual market price of his flesh,
which would be a relatively low amount for unremarkable
items, or, Moore could be paid a royalty for the licensed use of
his cells and organs in commercial medical research.
C. Other Situations Involving Property Rights in Human Cells and
Tissues
There are other situations involving research on human
tissue which argue for the existence of a property right in ex-
cised human cells, tissues or organs. These involve the use of
fetal tissue in research for commercial purposes. Moore is con-
cerned with the use of diseased tissues which must be removed
from the patient in order to cure him. However, in the case of
aborted fetal tissue or placentas, neither the patient nor the
tissue is unhealthy, and there is no curative benefit to the pa-
tient upon their removal. Moore benefited from the removal
of his spleen, while a new mother does not receive the same
type of benefit from the removal of the placenta from her
body since she is not ill. An example follows.
1. A Hypothetical
During childbirth, a healthy, uninfected placenta is re-
moved from a patient who is being treated in a hospital. It is
sent to the hospital laboratory from which it is stolen by a
greedy and unethical medical researcher from another labora-
tory. The "crooked" researcher develops a valuable cell, line
from the placenta, and finds a way to have it patented and
marketed commercially as an anti-aging cream. As a result, the
researcher and the cosmetics manufacturing company realize
great profit. The patient from whom the part was removed was
not informed of the potential value of her body part, although
it was common knowledge to the doctor and the researcher.
The patient gave no consent for its use beyond consent for
146. See id.
147. Id.
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medical treatment which resulted in the part's removal from
her body during the birth of her child. Who has what property
rights and what are the remedies available to the patient?
2. Discussion
Few people are aware that some hospitals collect afterbirth
and sell it to others to extract the hormones."" These hor-
mones are then used in scientific research and for commercial
purposes.' This situation is similar to that found in Moore.
The hospital is exercising some right of ownership over those
tissues. Unlike the situation as it exists in Moore,"s there is no
infectious waste involved in this hypothetical. California law
requires infectious waste to be properly disposed of by the
hospital or doctor if the procedure is done in an office.'
This would seem to imply a limited right of control over the
tissue for purposes of waste or scientific research, but not
necessarily for commercial use. 5' While there are guidelines
for the disposal of non-infectious waste, there are no require-
ments for its destruction.5
This scenario involving the sale of a placenta may be dis-
tinguished from that of the sale of Moore's spleen and other
tissues on the basis that placentas are generally not considered
infectious waste unless they are, in fact, infected. Thus the
doctor or hospital does not obtain even the limited statutory
property right of disposal. It follows that if they do not possess
the right of disposal they should not possess the broader right
of sale.
148. Andrews, supra note 40, at 30-31; Hardiman, supra note 18, at 227; see
also NEW DEVELOPMENTS supra note 31.
149. Andrews, supra note 40, at 30-31; Hardiman, supra note 18, at 227; see
also NEW DEVELOPMENTS 31.
150. Id.
151. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1992). In California:
[R]ecognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, * * * anatomical hu-
man remains, or infectious waste following conclusion of scientific use
shall be disposed of by interment * * * incineration, or any other
method determined by the state department to protect the public health and
safety. As used in this section "infectious waste" means any materal or
article which has been, or may have been, exposed to contagious or infectious
disease.
CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 7054.4. (West 1992).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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The gap remains. "Once the cells are excised from the
body they are no longer the property of the patient, but until
they are patented, they do not belong to anyone else, except
for purposes of disposal by incineration, interment, or any
other method determined by the state department of health to
protect the public health and safety."M  The law permits ex-
cised human cells to be disposed of by the hospital or used for
scientific research, but it does not permit them to be used for
any purpose that is primarily commercial." In effect, the
courts and legislature have supported the public policy of the
altruistic search for knowledge for the good of mankind, while
avoiding the compromise of human dignity for profit.
There is a second level on which the cells of the placenta
may be distinguished from the cells removed from Moore.
Placenta cells are a waste product of the female body which is
expelled when a woman gives birth. In that sense, it has not
been removed from the woman's body in any medical proce-
dure, but is an unnecessary portion of the body which is left
behind naturally. For legal purposes, this may be considered to
be an abandonment of this tissue." Abandoned property is
defined as that property "to which [the] owner has relin-
quished all right, title, claim, and possession, with intention of
not reclaiming it or resuming its ownership, possession or
enjoyment." 57 To be considered abandoned, the property
must be intentionally abandoned and the owner must claim no
right to it. 58 The finder of abandoned tissue becomes its
owner and prevails against all but the true owner. There-
fore, either the hospital or doctor as the finder of this aban-
doned afterbirth becomes its owner.
One problem with this rule is that the chattel, in this case
the human tissue, must have been voluntarily and intentionally
.abandoned."6 The sloughing of the afterbirth is an involun-
154. See generally Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 488-89
& n.20 (Cal. 1990) (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1992));
see also supra note 150.
155. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 1992); see also supra
note 150.
156. Venner v. State, 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. App. 1976).
157. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 2 (6th ed. 1990).
158. W. B. RAUSHENBUSH, BROWN ON PERSONAL PROPERTY 8-9 (3d ed. 1975).
159. Id. at 24.
160. Id. at 8-9.
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tary process. However, leaving it in the hospital can be consid-
ered voluntary abandonment, since it can be presumed that
most people would have no desire to keep that tissue. Yet it
has been recognized that some people prefer to retain parts of
their bodies that have been removed or expelled; these items
may be returned to the patient as long as they are not infec-
tious waste, an aborted viable fetus, or items required for the
medical records of the patient which must be kept by the hos-
pital pathologist and other doctors. 6"
Venner v. State62 is one of the leading cases involving the
utilization of discarded bodily tissues and fluids.'63 In this
case, the excrement of a patient who had swallowed several
drug-filled balloons which burst in his body was held to be
abandoned by a Maryland appellate court.'" In dicta, the
court stated that "[i]t is not unknown for a person to assert a
continuing right of ownership... over such things as excre-
ment,... blood, and organs or other parts of the body, wheth-
er their separation from the body is intentional, accidental, or
merely the result of normal bodily functions."'" The court
also stated that "[w]hen one places, or permits others to place
waste material from his body into the stream of ultimate dispo-
sition as waste, he has abandoned whatever legal right he
theretofore had to protect it from prying eyes or acquisitive
hands. " " According to this case, placentas, surgical wastes
and all other medical wastes are abandoned property in which
any finder may acquire property rights. There is a succession
of possession, but no succession of ownership.
D. Further Complications Involving Frozen Embryos
Another form of human tissue which may be used for
commercialization or scientific research is that of the frozen
embryos which are cultivated for use in the process of in vitro
fertilization.'6 The gametes or sex cells which are taken vol-
161. Venner, 354 A.2d at 498.
162. 354 A.2d 483 (Md. Ct. App. 1976).
163. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1377.
164. Venner, 354 A.2d at 485-86.
165. Id. at 498.
166. Id. at 499.
167. Robertson, supra note 85, at 9. Embryo freezing is an adjunct to in vitro
fertilization. Id. at 7.
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untarily from the patients are distinct genetic material whose
structure can be distinguished from the cells of other human
beings.'
This identification is possible because only human sexual
cells specifically contain the specific identity of the person or
the "genetic library.""' It is at this point that concepts of in-
vasion of privacy for the appropriation of a person's likeness
become relevant. The law of torts forbids the misappropriation
of another person's image or likeness for profit as a part of
the right to privacy."
When a doctor artificially cultivates human embryos out-
side of the womb for the purpose of in vitro fertilization, it is
often the case that several "back-up" embryos are made in case
a transplant is not successful.' Two issues arise with respect
to these "extra" embryos. The first concern is that doctors or
scientists will experiment on these tissues. The second is the
fate of these tissues in the event that a couple who has been
involved in this process decides to divorce or terminate the
relationship.
The first problem is more easily solved. In order to use
any of these materials in research or transfer them to others to
be used for research, or in another attempt at fertilization, the
donee should obtain the consent of both parties."' The sec-
ond situation is more complex since it involves the separate
and distinct property rights of two people in the same embry-
os. For the married couple, the frozen embryos may be viewed
as community property to be divided equally between the par-
ties in community property states."' Equitable division of this
type of property would be difficult at best. In the case of an
unmarried couple, each party may have a separate property
interest in the same tissue."4 A conflict arises when one of
168. I& at 9.
169. See I J. Watson, et al, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY OF THE GENE, 4th ed., 596
(1987).
170. "One who appropriates to his own use or benefit the name or likeness of
another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy." RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652(c) (1977).
171. Robertson, supra note 85, at 7.
172. Robertson, supra note 85, at 11.
173. Robertson, supra note 85, at 10; see also York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421
(1989); Andrews, supra note 40, at 31.
174. Andrews, supra note 40, at 31; American Fertility Society, Ethical Statement
[Vol. 32980
HUMAN PROPERTY GAP
the two parties wishes to continue in vitro fertilization in direct
opposition to the wishes of the other contributing party. 5
Once again, possession is in the hands of the doctor or labora-
tory in which the embryos are stored; yet, due to the special
nature of these cells, ownership rights are in the two parties
who contributed cells. 7 Property rights exist in this emotion-
al setting in a form that invites conflict and precludes resolu-
tion.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Informed Consent
The simplest way to resolve the problem of the gap in
property rights presented by the Moore' case would be for
the legislature to require any doctor or researcher who is inter-
ested in using a patient's cells for commercial research to ob-
tain his informed consent to that use of his cells before they
are removed from his body. Once such consent has been giv-
en, the tissue would become the property of the doctor or
researcher to whom the person assigns his dispositional inter-
est in the cells. Potential abuses of this process could be avoid-
ed by imposing heavy ethical and criminal sanctions for physi-
cians who either do not obtain informed consent or who re-
fuse medical care in an effort to force patients to relinquish
the rights to their cells.
Doctors should also be prohibited from acting as
middle-men or flesh-peddlers. Compensation should not go to
the doctors unless they take part in the successful development
and patenting of a product, or receive a sort of finder's fee for
locating a patient with the type of cells required for research.
The primary function of a doctor is to treat diseases. This can
be accomplished through scientific research, but can hardly be
said to result from the commercial exploitation of patients.
on In Vitro Fertilization, FERTILITY & STERILITY 41, 12 (1984).
175. Robertson, supra note 85, at 9.
176. Robertson, supra note 85, at 9.
177. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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B. Waiver
Requiring a patient to sign a waiver of commercial interest
in cells, tissues, or organs which may be removed from his
body during medical treatments is another possible solution to
this problem. A waiver is "the intentional or voluntary relin-
quishment of a known right, or such conduct as warrants an
interference of the relinquishment of such right ... .",' Un-
fortunately, such waiver is illegal since federal law "prohibit[s]
the use of exculpatory language in consent forms that effect or
appear to effect a waiver of the subject's legal rights."" 9
C. Licensing
The development of a licensing system for human cells,
organs, and tissues would enable the patients to partake of any
financial benefits resulting from the research and commercial-
ization of their cells."8 A license is defined as "[t]he permis-
sion by competent authority to do an act which, without such
permission, would be illegal, a trespass, or a tort."8' In order
to give a license, the patient must possess enough property
rights in his cells to maintain a cause of action for trespass or
in tort for the action of the doctor or hospital or such action
must not be illegal. As the California Supreme Court has stat-
ed in Moore, a patient whose cells have been removed from his
body does not have a sufficient property interest in that mate-
rial to sustain a cause of action for conversion.82 Thus, a pa-
tient would be unable to give a license for the use of his body
parts since he has no property rights in them to protect once
they are detached from his body. Before parts are removed, a
patient may be able to negotiate and grant a license for those
178. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1580 (6th ed. 1990).
179. Lavoie, supra note 2, at 1376. Current law is that:
[n]o informed consent, whether oral or written, may include any ex-
culpatory language through which the subject or the representative is
made to waive or appear to waive any of the subject's legal rights, or
releases or appears to release the investigator, the sponsor, the institu-
tion or its agents from liability for negligence.
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1991).
180. Danforth, supra note 1, at 199.
181. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 919-20 (6th ed. 1990).
182. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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biological materials, but that would have to be accomplished
while the patient was still in possession of and exercising full
property rights.'
D. Bailment
Bailment presents a similar problem. Bailment is defined
as:
A delivery of goods or personal property, by one person
to another, in trust for the execution of a special object
upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the
bailor or bailee or both, and upon a contract, express or
implied, to perform the trust and carry out such object,
and thereupon either to redeliver the goods to the bailor
or otherwise dispose of the same in conformity with the
purpose of the trust.'
The true owner is the bailor, "the party who bails or delivers
goods to another in the contract of bailment."'85 Usually, the
hospital pathologist takes possession of the cells once they
have been removed from a body. He keeps them for compari-
son, record, or until disposal. Since either he or the doctor has
actual possession of the materials, they would be the
bailees." If they are employees of the hospital, the hospital
or its administrators may be considered to be the bailees
should any liability arise under the theory of respondeat supe-
rior.87 Yet the patient does not have enough property rights
in those cells to be considered their owner." Again, a pro-
posed resolution of the problem fails because of the gap in
ownership of the human biological materials.
A system of bailment or licensing would account for the
continuity of possession in the body parts but for the lack of
clear ownership interests in the interim period between remov-
al from the body and the patenting of a new product made
183. Id.
184. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 142 (6th ed. 1990).
185. Id.
186. See BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990).
187. The theory of respondeat superior states that the "master is responsible
for want of care on [the] servant's part toward those to whom master owes duty
to use care, provided failure of servant to use such care occurred in the course
of his employment." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1312 (6th ed. 1990).
188. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
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from them. Either of these systems may work for the frozen
embryos since property rights can be determined under a the-
ory of misappropriation of a person's likeness and genetically
specific identification of those cells with those contributors. 89
However, for cells, organs and tissues excised from living hu-
man beings, the fact that the patient has insufficient property
interests in those biological materials to support a cause of
action for conversion would imply that he also has insufficient
property rights in them to support a license or bailment.
E. Combinations
Another possible solution to the problem would be to
preserve the patient's dispositional rights in the cells after re-
moval with informed consent, then to give the tissue to the
hospital pathologist in bailment. In this case they could keep
the cells, tissues, or organs as bailees for the patients who
would still have a sufficient dispositional property right in the
cells to act as bailors. In any case, the patient is the most re-
cent owner of the cells, and thus, the most logical person with
whom to continue those rights until they are used for commer-
cial scientific research."9
Another alternative would be to eliminate doctors as the
middle-men in the sale or transfer of human organisms for
commercial research by forcing the commercial entities to
contract directly with the patients while they are still owners of
the cells. 9' Alternatively, the doctor could be paid a speci-
fied, limited fee for his services in bringing patients and re-
searchers together. Both the fees and the transfers should be
regulated by either the American Medical Association, the state
medical association, or another appropriate organization in
order to maintain a high level of ethical standards.
Since the California Supreme Court has refused to deter-
mine who has what rights to human biological material that
has been removed from a living patient and which is to be
used in commercial research, and since the Supreme Court of
the United States has denied Moore's application for a writ of
certiorari," it is up to the legislatures to decide who owns
189. Danforth, supra note 1, at 193.
190. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 499 (Cal. 1990).
191. Id. at 479.
192. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cel. denied,
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that property during that period.'" Given the fact that the
patient was the most recent owner of the tissue, and that no
one can obtain anything greater than a property interest for
the purpose of scientific research or disposal in those materials
until a unique, differentiated cell line or .other product has
been created and patented, a minimal dispositional property
interest should remain with the patient." Combined with the
present requirement that a patient give informed consent to
the use of his tissues in medical research, the succession of
ownership is continuous.' The patient has at least that much
of a right to the ownership of his own body parts whether they
are attached or not.
Although none of these remedies would be viable standing
alone, given the gap between ownership by the cell generator
and ownership by the doctor or researcher which presently
exists, it is possible for the legislature to cure what the courts
will not. It may do so by passing a law which defines owner-
ship rights in cells which have been excised from a living hu-
man and used for commercial scientific research without the
consent of the patient. Once the cells have been altered suffi-
ciently for researchers to obtain a patent on the product de-
rived from them, the cells become the property of the patent
holders in their altered state." The patient generally receives
no compensation for his cells or from the patent.9 7 New leg-
islation could bridge the property gap by completing the chain
of ownership.
Another facet of this solution would be to drastically limit
the amount of compensation a doctor may receive for bringing
a patient and a commercial research company together. If the
potential financial rewards were significantly reduced, the doc-
tors would have less incentive to take advantage of innocent
patients. In addition, the legislature may choose to require the
written informed consent of the patient to commercial re-
search on his cells prior to their removal as a prerequisite to
their commercial research use. This would result in a waiver of
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
193. I.
194. Id. at 499.
195. Id. at 501.
196. Id. at 492.
197. 1d,
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the patient's rights in his cells, and again solve the problem of
the ownership gap by giving those rights to another.
F. Proposed Legislation
The theme of this comment is that Moore v Regents of the
University of California' is wrongly decided with respect to
the property issue. Humans may not have a sufficient property
interest in their excised body parts to constitute a cause of
action for conversion. However, they should have a sufficient
property interest in those parts to constitute a cause of action
for misappropriation of them and to prevent the unjust enrich-
ment of doctors and researchers. Following is a model statute
which would overrule Moore to a limited degree, giving patients
a sufficient property interest in their own excised parts to con-
stitute a license. It requires informed consent and accounts for
third-party ownership and development of the cells and subse-
quent patents, while preventing the free market approach to
sales of human flesh which so concerned Justice Panelli in
Moore.
California Health and Safety Code Section XXXXX
1. Any cell, tissue, or organs as defined previously in this
code which is removed, excised, sloughed or expelled from a
human subject shall be considered the property of the subject
or his guardian or representative for the purpose of granting a
license for their use in commercial or scientific research and
development unless:
a. The subject has consented in writing to the use of the
cell, tissue or organ in commercial research;
b. The subject has affirmatively waived his property inter-
est in the cell, tissue, or organ;
c. The subject has died; or
d. The subject has donated the cell, tissue, or organ for
use in scientific or commercial research and development.
2. The subject's property in the excised or sloughed cell,
tissue, or organs shall be limited to the right to grant a license
for commercial research and development of such cell, tissue,
or organ.
198. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cen. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
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VI. CONCLUSION
A legislative solution is required to remedy the problems
left by the Moore" case. By holding that the patient has an
insufficient property interest in his excised cells to support a
cause of action for conversion while upholding the exclusive
right of the doctors and the research institute to the profits of
the patent,' the court declines to address the issue of who
owns the biological material while the research is being per-
formed and the patentable cell line is being developed. The
court also failed to recognize the patient's significant contribu-
tion to the development of the patent and his implied right to
participate in its commercial success."0 It never explains how
the ownership was transferred from the patient to either the
doctor or the research institute. Although the patient has some
dispositional interest in his cells by virtue of federal law, he no
longer has full ownership of the cells according to California
law.' Rather, he has a negative right to prevent someone
from doing scientific research on his cells."0 He is not able to
prevent anyone from appropriating his cells for commercial
scientific development.
Although Moore was unethically treated by his physician,
the court is unwilling to allow him enough of an ownership
interest in his own cells to participate in the extreme financial
benefit which resulted to his doctor and, the commercial enti-
ties involved.' The court has ruled that the part of every hu-
man being which is considered to be the most obvious symbol
of his identity, his body, is not considered to be exclusively his
own. 5 A doctor, researcher or commercial entity may profit
from the use of his cells, yet the patient is permitted no legal
remedy for the misappropriation of what, by all standards of
aesthetics and dignity, should be his property. This situation
should be remedied either through the courts or new legisla-
199. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal.), cel. denie4
111 S. Ct. 1388 (1990).
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204. Id.
205. Id.
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tion. Property rights in human body parts must be defined and
protected in our legal system.
Gina M. Grandolfo
